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RESUMO 
Esse estudo explora os efeitos do feedback sobre a cooperação no Dilema do Prisioneiro Iterado (DPI). Quatro 
fontes de feedbacks foram identificadas: apresentados por pares, consumidores, feedbacks de mercado e culturais. 
Feedbacks de pares e consumidores foram considerados intrínsecos ao DPI, uma vez que não foram manipulados, mas 
analisados. Feedbacks de mercado e culturais abrangeram variáveis independentes e seus efeitos foram medidos a partir da 
cooperação entre os jogadores e grupos (variáveis dependentes). Vinte e sete participantes jogaram o DPI, divididos em 9 
grupos com três jogadores cada. Cooperação foi medida como taxas de respostas cooperativas X sobre o total de escolhas, 
bem como os produtos agregados de cada grupo. No nível molecular (momento a momento), foi observado um efeito 
significativo intra-grupo do feedback de mercado F(1, 28) = 6.50, p = .02, ηp2 = .19. No nível molar, não houve efeito 
significativo do feedback de mercado, tampouco do feedback cultural. Não foi possível estabelecer uma metacontingência 
entre a cooperação recorrente nos grupos e consequências contingentes positivas. Os jogadores apresentaram 
comportamentos de escolha subótimos, buscando maximizar ganhos relativos individuais (desertando) sobre ganhos 
absolutos em seus grupos (cooperando). Esses resultados são discutidos à luz de como a fonte de feedback pode sustentar 
a cooperação ou a deserção no DPI e suas implicações nos ambientes organizacionais. Reforçar comportamentos 
cooperativos pode ser essencial para a manutenção e o desenvolvimento de organizações, uma vez que o feedback 
informativo sobre o desempenho pode ser insuficiente. Este estudo contribui para a compreensão de escolhas econômicas 
em grupos, sob a perspectiva de seleção cultural. 
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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the effects of feedback on cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG). Four 
sources of feedback were identified: peer, buyer, market and cultural feedback. Peer and buyer feedback were intrinsic to 
the PDG, for they were analyzed, but not manipulated. Market and cultural feedback comprised independent variables and 
their effects were measured on players’ and group cooperation (dependent variables). Twenty-seven participants played a 
PDG, divided in 9 groups of 3 players each. Cooperation was measured as rates of individual players’ cooperative X 
choices, and as aggregate products within groups. At the molecular (moment-to-moment) level, there was a significant 
within-subjects main effect of the market feedback F(1, 28) = 6.50, p = .02, ηp2 = .19. At the molar level, there was no 
significant effect of the market feedback, nor of the cultural feedback. It was not possible to establish a metacontingency 
between recurrent group cooperation and positive contingent group consequences. Players displayed sub-optimal choice 
behavior, seeking to maximize relative earnings within their group (defecting) over absolute earnings (cooperating). These 
results are discussed in light of how the source of feedback may sustain cooperation or defection in the PDG, and their 
implications in organizational settings. Reinforcing cooperative behaviors can be key to the maintenance and development 
of any organization, for informative performance feedback may not suffice. This study contributes to the understanding of 
economic decisional behavior in groups from a cultural selectionist perspective. 





This work has been financially supported by OsloMet – Oslo Metropolitan University. The first author’s research exchange in Milan, 
Italy, was funded by an Erasmus+ staff mobility grant. Thanks to Are Hugo Pripp for his help with the statistical analysis and reporting; 
Nicholas J. Bergin and Kalliu Carvalho Couto for their exceptional feedback on an earlier draft of this manuscript; Flora Lorenzo for 
her translation to Portuguese, and to Aécio Borba and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. 




COOPERATION IN THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME 
71 
Several scientific approaches and fields of study 
have addressed the complex social phenomenon of 
cooperation. It is a fundamental topic, ranging from how 
genes interact to the evolution of financial markets. Like 
competition and exchange, cooperation is an elementary 
type of social behavior for its ubiquity and importance in 
social life (Schmitt, 1998). According to Keller and 
Schoenfeld (1950), for cooperation to occur, “the 
combined behavior of two or more organisms is needed 
to procure positive, or remove negative, reinforcement 
for either” (p. 353, italics in original). The general 
definition of cooperation implies gaining advantages for 
all parties involved. Cooperation depends on the 
concurrent behavior of at least two organisms, who 
eventually share a common consequence (Brayko, 
Houmanfar, & Ghezzi, 2016). From an experimental 
approach to the analysis of behavior, Schmitt (1998) 
stated that under a cooperative contingency “…all 
participants receive a reinforcer if their responses 
collectively meet a specified performance criterion” (p. 
471). 
This study assumes a cultural perspective on 
cooperation, focusing on the interplay of multiple 
agents’ choice behavior. Choice refers to selecting one 
alternative or course of action and forgoing another 
(Martin, Yu, Martin, & Fazzio, 2006). Within a social 
episode, choice behavior means response allocation, 
which may assume (mutually) reinforcing value in 
relation to another person or a group. Experimental 
studies of choice in behavior analysis inform “both (1) 
how preferences develop, under different schedules of 
reinforcement, and (2) how existing preferences 
influence learning” (Rachlin, 1976, p. 545). 
The prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) is a widely 
adopted experimental setting for studying and measuring 
cooperation. Introduced in 1950 by RAND consultants 
Flood and Dresher as an intellectual riddle, it depicts a 
“precise mathematical construct and also a real-life 
problem” (Poundstone, 1992, p. 8). The two-player PDG 
is based on avoiding loss, since betrayal or defection 
gives the first defector an advantage over the other 
player. This is also the decision rule programmed by the 
minimax theorem (Von Neumann, 1928, who founded 
the field of game theory as a mathematical discipline 
[Kuhn & Tucker, 1958]), which minimizes loss in worst-
case scenarios. However, if both players cooperate, loss 
is avoided altogether. This variant was later replaced 
with a situation in which monetary earnings were 
introduced after each encounter. Mutual cooperation 
resulted in second highest payoffs for both players; 
defection of one player granted the highest payoff if the 
opponent cooperated, thus, earning the least; mutual 
defection resulted in the third highest payoff for both 
players (i.e., less than mutual cooperation, and more than 
cooperation if the opponent defected). As a result, both 
players suffer greater losses, despite making the most 
rational choice for themselves, than if their behavior had 
been cooperative. Interpreted in terms of self-control, 
“cooperation benefits the group but is costly to the 
individual (relative to defection), yet a significant 
number of players choose to cooperate” (Locey, Safin, & 
Rachlin, 2013, p. 85). 
The iterated (or repeated) PDG is considered a 
more versatile version than the original “one-shot” PDG, 
for it adds a temporal dimension to the study of strategic 
interactions between players over time. Moreover, it meets 
the requirement of recurrent behavior, which is one of the 
two conditions (the other condition being a selecting 
environmental consequence) for the establishment of a 
metacontingency (see Delgado, 2012). The main 
differences between the iterated PDG and the one-time 
PDG are (a) the players’ payoffs, which are converted from 
number of sentenced years to prison (loss-framed) to 
monetary gains, and (b) the repetition of the same choice-
task over a period of finite rounds. 
The PDG is an elective scenario for addressing the 
boundaries of Homo economicus, which is adopted as an 
anti-model by subscribers to the behavioral economics 
paradigm (e.g., Henrich et al., 2001; Yamagishi, Li, 
Takagishi, Matsumoto, & Kiyonari, 2014). The dilemma 
lies in the ambiguity embodied in the game setting: namely, 
the most beneficial outcomes for the (self-serving) 
individual do not reflect the most beneficial outcomes for 
the (prosociality of the) group. These opposed choice 
behaviors have been previously addressed as forms of free 
riding and collusion, respectively (Cunningham, 1967). 
Although each player’s choice needs be considered in 
relation to any other players’ choice, for the aims of this 
study we refer to the convention of interpreting defection 
(or free riding) as the behavior of choosing Y, and 
cooperation (or collusion) as the behavior of choosing X (cf.  
Rachlin & Locey, 2011; Yi & Rachlin, 2004). Previous 
research has showed how the PDG can be effectively 
adopted to study constructs such as fairness, altruism and 
cooperation at large (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Falk 
& Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Locey, Jones, 
& Rachlin, 2011; Marwell & Schmitt, 1972; Poundstone, 
1992; Rachlin, 2002). 
Support for the idea that cooperation is a learned 
and transmitted cultural practice (Couto, 2018) derives from 
instances of an ecological PDG, namely in the literature of 
evolutionary biology and social anthropology (Wilson, 
2015). Some species of felines are highly efficient in 
hunting large prey in the savannah thanks to a set of 
acquired collective behaviors and signals (e.g., Kozlowski, 
2012). Some primates develop shared cultural practices for 
better adapting to hostile environments, improving their 
hygiene, and improving the taste of their food by means of 
washing sweet potatoes (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2002; Bell, 
Koranyi, Buchner, & Rothermund, 2017; Soutschek, 
Sauter, & Schubert, 2015). Tomasello and Vaish (2013) 
addressed cooperation in preverbal humankind, arguing for 
the emergence and development of altruism and morality 
(see also Axelrod, 1984, 1986; Ruse, 2012). 
In analytical game theory, a Nash equilibrium is a 
proposed solution to a game according to which no player 
can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their 
strategy (Nash, 1951). This applies to all non-cooperative 
games featuring a finite number of periods (see also Holth 
& Roth, 2004; Myerson, 1978). In one-time games, 
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defection usually leads to the highest payoffs, whereas in 
iterated games, strategies are likely to develop (Norman & 
Wallace, 2011). Similarly, whereas defection (Y) represents 
the most profitable choice and strategy for every single 
player in the PDG, cooperation (X) grants the highest 
cumulative payoffs for the group. If players are not 
permitted to communicate and their choices are displayed 
simultaneously (cf. sequentially; see Clark & Sefton, 2001), 
the experiment does not feature a manifest coordination of 
strategies. Conversely, iterated games address how 
coordinated choice may be established and sustained over 
time. This process may be termed as learning and is affected 
by the availability and delivery of feedback. 
Feedback is an imprecise, non-technical concept 
in the behavior analytic literature. Broadly defined, 
feedback refers to both verbal and non-verbal responses 
(i.e., information), aimed at adjusting performance in a 
desired or optimal fashion. However, information alone 
may not suffice to initiate (let alone sustain) behavior 
change. If feedback contains an assessment of performance, 
it serves as a consequence of that behavior. In 
organizational behavior management, performance 
feedback equals information about past performance 
(Alvero, Bucklin, & Austin, 2001), and whether feedback 
has a reinforcing or punishing effect is an empirical 
question. 
Feedback can be defined as “information about the 
gap between the actual level and the reference level of a 
system parameter which is used to alter the gap in some 
way” (Ramaprasad, 1983, p. 4). Steve Draper (2005) 
distinguished between the technical notion of feedback, 
defined as “extra information an entity gets (only) as a result 
of its acting” (p. 2) and its sharing modalities through 
discussion and interaction, which are embodied in the 
process of feedback delivery. Fishbach, Eyal and 
Finkelstein (2010) explored the signaling and informative 
effects of receiving and delivering feedback on individuals’ 
goal pursuit and commitment, such as maximizing one’s 
earnings in the PDG. In performance management, 
delivering feedback tends to take the form of a specific 
consequence contingent on the agent’s behavior (e.g., 
praising the sale of a stock that reaches its highest market 
value, or withholding a bonus for failing to meet a project 
deadline). According to Daniels and Daniels (2004), 
feedback works best when it reliably signals that positive 
reinforcement will follow the appropriate behavior. We 
speak of reinforcement only if the likelihood that a response 
will occur increases. Feedback equals reinforcement only 
when it increases the probability of similar behavior in the 
future. When feedback signals the presentation of a 
reinforcer, it may acquire the function of a discriminative 
stimulus, signaling that if a given response class is emitted, 
there is a probability that certain consequences may follow. 
The actual consequence may reinforce the behavior that 
produced it, as a function of previous learning (see Catania, 
2007). 
Throughout this study, we refer to feedback as 
verbal and non-verbal consequent stimulation that is both 
contingent on particular aspects of the behavior and that 
exerts control over directional changes in future behavior. 
Feedback is often provided with the assumption that it will 
affect future performance; however, it does not on several 
occasions. In a PDG, the consequences of each player’s 
behavior assume relative significance, as they are 
normatively established by the purpose and rules of the 
game. Hence, feedback affects cooperation or defection, if 
it describes the function of learning or adaptation to a new 
choice behavior. It denotes a precise and technical 
relationship, which may strengthen or weaken the 
occurrence of future similar choices depending on its 
contingencies of reinforcement, insofar as feedback is 
inserted within a three-term contingency model. 
Behavioral game theory addresses instances of 
social interaction and how the feedback of one agent’s 
choice influences another agent’s choice. It is a 
descriptively more adequate alternative to the field of 
analytical game theory, which “concerns the behaviour of 
decision makers whose decisions affect each other” 
(Aumann, 2008, p. 1; see also Poundstone, 1992). 
Although the origins and most extensive adoptions of 
game theory may be traced to the field of experimental 
economics (e.g., Embrey, Fréchette, & Yuksel, 2015; 
Rubinstein, 1986), because of its flexibility of adaptation 
and translational implications, the PDG has been exported 
to the social sciences (Colman, 2013; Ostrom, 2000), 
neurobiology (Bell et al., 2017; Soutschek et al., 2015), 
and behavior analysis. Fidelis and Faleiros (2017) engaged 
in a systematic review of the use of the PDG in the 
experimental analysis of behavior and found 23 
applications of the game, which represented only 7% of 
their search results of applications of the PDG. The 
authors identified an increase and continuity of 
applications of the PDG published in scientific journals, 
specifically on the manipulation of social relations and 
self-control. However, only three experiments adopted the 
PDG and contained an analysis of metacontingencies 
(Costa, Nogueira, & Vasconcelos, 2012; Morford & 
Cihon, 2013; Ortu, Becker, Woelz, & Glenn, 2012). 
The metacontingency (Glenn, 1986, 1988, 1991) 
is a conceptual tool (Todorov, 2006) that describes a 
functional relationship between (a) interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing individual choices interlocking 
behavioral contingencies – IBCs), (b) which produce an 
aggregate product (AP), and (c) their selecting 
environment (Glenn et al., 2016). In the PDG, 
metacontingencies include (a) the players’ choices to 
cooperate or defect, (b) the cumulative choices and 
relative payoff of the group, and (c) the positive 
contingent group consequence (i.e., market feedback). The 
AP is treated as the result of players’ IBCs, which taken 
together comprise a culturant, and the contingent group 
consequence delivered on fulfilling the criterion of 
cooperating (see Figure 1). Since the game is iterated, the 
attractiveness of receiving a contingent group 
consequence (i.e., bonus points, equally divided among 
each player) is expected to affect subsequent rounds of the 
game, once the contingency has been established. This 
represents a carry-over effect: the increase in likelihood of 
meeting the requirements for achieving both individual 
and collective gain from the cooperative choice. 





Figure 1. Metacontingency and feedback loops concerning players’ decisional relationship towards one another in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game. 
Note. The lines represent feedback loops. In this study, dashed lines are analyzed but were not manipulated; solid lines 
were manipulated. The outline shows interdependent operant consequences for individual player choices and contingent 
group consequence on the aggregate product. During each round, the players choose X or Y and earn points. In addition, a 
contingent group consequence in the form of money earned by the company is delivered as market feedback. The value of 
the market feedback is contingent on the aggregate product that has been produced by the three players (Adapted from 
Ortu et al., 2012, p. 114. 
 
Examples of metacontingencies in organizational 
settings have been discussed since the beginning of the 
2000s (Malott, 2003; see also Glenn & Malott, 2004; 
Houmanfar & Rodrigues, 2006; Malott & Glenn, 2006), and 
to a lesser extent in organizational behavior management 
(e.g., Biglan, 2009; Sandaker, 2009). Organizations depend 
on cooperation between their members for their objectives 
to be achieved, and in order to meet the selection criteria of 
the consumers (i.e., survive in the market). Thus, 
complexity characterizes possibly several organizations 
within a system, which may be embedded within a closed 
market. Fostering cooperative choices requires a 
multidimensional understanding of how to best regulate 
individual and group behavior. Supported by the findings 
from previous studies, the PDG provides both a suitable and 
reliable interdisciplinary setup for experimental control of 
the contingencies that sustain coordinated behavior in 
groups, and some of the procedural elements of the 
metacontingency. 
In one of the studies identified by Fidelis and 
Faleiros (2017), a PDG was used to establish a 
metacontingency of cooperation among four simultaneous 
players. The effects of the metacontingency persisted even 
though individual earnings were minimal compared to 
group earnings (Ortu et al., 2012). In a second study, the 
authors explored the effects of a metacontingency and 
verbal behavior (i.e., consensus) in the coordination of 
choice behavior (Costa et al., 2012). In addition to 
introducing a metacontingency, a third study featured the 
option to fine defectors from the common good and found 
that fining behavior did not affect players’ cooperation 
(Morford & Cihon, 2013). 
The objectives of this study are twofold. First, we 
study players’ choice behavior in the PDG to test whether 
rates of cooperation may be affected by altering the source 
of feedback. We introduce the PDG and discuss how it may 
contribute to the study of cultural phenomena with minor 
adjustments. Next, we discuss how the source of feedback 
may sustain cooperation or defection in the PDG. The 
experiment explores the effects of two manipulated 
feedback sources on individual choice behavior and group 
cooperation: they are presented as instances of molecular 
and molar paradigms (Baum, 2004) of choice. 
Second, this study investigates whether a 
metacontingency may be established between players’ 
cooperative choices and a contingent group consequence. 
This consequence is positive for both the individual and the 
group (i.e., is sustainable) and, within the PDG setting, 
comprises a bonus apt to eliminate the differential 
individual and group payoffs concurrently embedded in 
the dilemma. Hence, a cooperative cultural practice may 
be established, which grants the highest earnings and 
represents the optimal choice. The experimental findings 
are discussed in the underlying cultural selectionist 
perspective, and we conclude with some remarks on the 
experimental setting and its applied implications. 
 
METHOD 
Participants, Setting and Materials 
Twenty-seven adult participants were divided 
into 9 groups of 3 players each. Fifteen of them (ages 20 
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to 22, 10 female) were recruited from a university in 
Milan, Italy. They signed up on a voluntary basis, as part 
of their practical assignments within an undergraduate 
course in management in retail and fashion. The 
remaining 12 participants (ages 21 to 41, 8 female) were 
recruited from a university in Oslo, Norway. They were 
approached during their classes in health and social 
science, and through fliers posted on campus. The 
participants were invited into a dedicated room on the 
premises of their respective university campuses, either 
in Milan or Oslo. Between-group differences across 
locations were kept to a minimum, for example by using 
only English language throughout the experimental 
progress. 
 The experiments took place in a conference 
room on the premises of the two universities. The 
following materials were used: a laptop computer with a 
Windows® 10 operating system, a digital projector, a 
projector screen, and 3 sets of two A5 laminated cards 
displaying respectively the letter X and Y in large print. 
 
Ethics Statement 
Participants were treated in accordance with ethical 
standards of APA. All procedures performed in studies 
involving human participants were in accordance with 
the ethical standards and with the 1964 Helsinki 
Declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards. Informed consent was obtained from 
all individual participants included in the study. This 
study was approved by the Norwegian Social Science 
Data Service (NSD), n.45638 on November 12, 2015. 
 
Procedure 
The PDG can be modified in a number of ways 
to study cooperation and defection in dyads or larger 
groups (Poundstone, 1992). In order to expand on simple 
behavior-consequence dynamics based on the sums of 
payoffs and set the occasion for discriminating between 
self- and group interests, the PDG herein adopted 
featured some modifications. First, we used a payoff 
matrix that encouraged cooperative behaviors (X), with 
a narrower payoff gap between cooperation and free 
riding, increasing the likelihood of cooperation (Camerer 
& Thaler, 2003). 
Similar to other n-players iterated PDGs, the 
traditional dyad setting was expanded to include three 
simultaneous players to better account for the complexity 
of a closed market scenario, which resulted in the matrix 
shown in Table 1. The coordinated behavior of three 
players helps overcome the shortages in response 
patterns of dyads (from four to eight possible outputs) 
while avoiding defection to “almost dominate” over 
cooperation as n increases (Kuhn, 2019). Conversely, 
larger experimental groups enhance the development of 
a “cooperative agreement”, rather than cooperation itself 
(Bixenstine, Levitt, & Wilson, 1966, p. 494). Third, we 
introduced a metacontingency representing a functional 
relationship between the coordinated (choice) behavior 
of group members and a selecting consequence. 
Table 1 








3 X / 0 Y + 8 - 
2 X / 1 Y + 3 + 10 
1 X / 2 Y + 10 + 3 
0 X / 3 Y - + 1 
 
 Before the experiment began, the participants 
read and signed an informed consent letter. Next, the 
instructions (available as supplementary material) were 
presented on a separate sheet and read in plenary. Each 
participant was comfortably seated at a rectangular table 
and facing a wide screen, on which the experimenter 
projected a scoreboard designed in Excel®, illustrated in 
Figure 2(a). A nametag specifying the players’ number 
(Player 1, 2, or 3) was placed on the table in 
correspondence to their seat. Seats were not preassigned, 
nor noteworthy for the game conduct. Thus, the players 
were able to assign each choice (projected on the screen) 
to its enactor (seated at the table), without disclosing any 
of the participants’ real name; they could look at, but not 
talk to one another. The participants were instructed to 
see themselves in the role of co-owners of a 
manufacturing company. Their task was to maximize 
revenue, which depended on both their individual 
choices and the choices of the other players. 
At the beginning of each round, each player 
chose between two alternatives. Similarly, to previous 
studies featuring the PDG with metacontingencies, these 
were X and Y (Morford & Cihon, 2013; Ortu et al., 
2012), which represented two hypothetical and arbitrary 
products that they could sell to the experimenter, the only 
buyer in the closed market. Since no vocal 
communication was permitted, the participants displayed 
their choices to the experimenter by simultaneously 
raising the card corresponding to their product of choice. 
The lack of vocal and written topographies highlights the 
importance of (a) contingency-specifying stimuli, thus 
generating rules; and (b) the vocal and written 
topographies insofar as participants are able to emit 
duplics (see Michael, 1982), which permitted bypassing 
the shaping process and quickly displaying a high rate of 
cooperation (Anonymous, personal communication, 
November 22, 2019). The experimenter manually 
recorded the players’ choices in the first three columns 
of the scoreboard and assigned the respective payoff to 
each player according to the payoff matrix in the 
following three columns. Whenever the target 3X AP 
was met, the market feedback was added in the relevant 
column: this was verbally emphasized by the 
experimenter, who called “Bonus!”. 
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Figure 2. Excel® scoreboard grid without (a) and with (b) exposure to the cultural feedback: the latter includes an 
additional matrix displaying both players’ and group earnings. 
The end of the game was announced after 150 
rounds, which occurred on average 23 minutes after the start of 
the session (Mdn = 20.26 minutes). Subsequently, the 
experimenter provided a short debriefing session, explaining 
the objectives and the optimal choice strategies of the 
experiment and any remaining questions from the participants 
were answered. 
Four sources of feedback that might exert control on 
the players’ choice behavior throughout the PDG were 
identified: (a) peer feedback, (b) buyer feedback, (c) market 
feedback, and (d) cultural feedback. Peer feedback is each 
player’s verbal and non-verbal reactions to the other players’ 
choice behavior. Buyer feedback is the players’ payoffs, 
singularly or collectively taken. The delivery of a market 
feedback depends on the AP of the group (i.e., the outcome, 
given interdependency). This is usually termed cultural 
consequence and it features a bonus contingent on the 
presentation of a target buyer feedback (i.e., 3X). Finally, 
cultural feedback refers to the self-monitoring information of 
each player’s and the group earnings, which is different from 
how the term cultural consequence in used in the 
metacontingency literature (e.g., Glenn et al., 2016; see also 
Hunter, 2012). Hence, two concurrent schedules of 
reinforcement set the occasion for cooperation and defection, 
granting different payoffs. 
This PDG was programmed for two manipulations of 
feedback sources. During the first 39 rounds, market feedback 
was withheld, serving as a control condition (no-MF – market 
feedback). However, conservative conditions for stability 
criteria (i.e., “when no systematic increasing or decreasing 
trends are observed in some measured aspect of [choice] 
behavior” (Costa & Cançado, 2012, p. 63) of ten or more 
cooperative choices were not satisfied in any of the groups, for 
each player’s behavior featured relatively high variation 
(Salkind, 2010; see also Miller, 2006). At the start of round 40, 
each player received a bonus starting at 5€points on a 
continuous reinforcement schedule of reinforcement (CRF), 
and contingent on the production of the AP 3X for during any 
given round: this comprised a market feedback (MF) 
condition. Since the participants were not paid based on their 
earnings, €points are aimed at retaining both the score validity 
embodied in the iterated PDG and the product sales in the 
simulated market scenario. Hence, either the group received 
15€points or 0€points, since individual X choices were not 
rewarded whenever at least 1Y was chosen. 
Bonuses were increased by 1€point (up to 9€points) 
every tenth choice with defection (i.e., not-3X), in order to 
increase the attractiveness of subsequent reinforcement for 
cooperative choices. As the scoreboard was populated with the 
players’ choices, the program scrolled automatically 
downwards and displayed a new entry line. This allowed each 
player to see the 23 most recent choices regardless of whether 
the cultural feedback was available or not (i.e., in all 
conditions). This feedback was automatically updated at the 
end of each round and remained visible at all times, so each 
player was able to evaluate their performance in comparison 
with the other players’ and the group performance. 
Groups 1-3 (no-CF – cultural feedback) served as control 
groups, for they were not exposed to the cultural feedback. The 
cultural feedback allowed each player to have access to their 
own and the others’ previous choices, and their cumulative 
monetary value, which, in turn, may have assumed a 
discriminative function. Groups 4-9 (CF) comprised the 
experimental groups, for they received exposure to the cultural 
feedback. This consisted of an additional 2x4-cell matrix 
displayed in the top right corner of the screen in addition to the 
aforementioned scoreboard common to all conditions. The 
scoreboard (and the matrix, if applicable) were visible at all 
times and showed the cumulative earnings for each player and 
the group (Figure 2(b)). 




Figure 3. Molecular distribution of group choices (grey dots) and group earnings (black line) for all groups. 
Note. All groups were exposed to the market feedback starting from round 40 (MF). Groups 1-3- did not receive exposure 
to the cultural feedback (No CF); Groups 4-9 were exposed to the cultural feedback (CF). The discontinued dotted line 
represents the trendline of group choices, measured as aggregate products (plotted as secondary Y values). Dashed vertical 
lines separate control and experimental market feedback conditions 
 
Dependent experimental variables 
The two primary dependent variables include (a) 
the players’ molecular rates of cooperation (i.e., X choice), 
for each round, and (b) the molar rates of cooperation of the 
group (i.e., AP 3X), clustered in 30 blocks of 5 rounds each 
(partially based on Yi & Rachlin, 2004). This configuration 
of the AP corresponds to a purely cooperative group choice. 
Secondary measures concerned players’ and group 
earnings, and any group consequence. 
 
RESULTS 
 The results are reported based on the relevant 
dependent experimental variable under analysis: (a) the 
individual players’ choice behavior and (b) the cooperative 
aggregate product of the group, respectively. Hence, the 
results include both a molecular and a molar analysis of 
cooperative choice behavior in the PDG. The data was 
prepared for analysis using Excel® for Windows® and 
subsequent data analyses and outputs were performed by 
SPSS Statistics 25®. SPSS outputs of the performed 
analyses are included as supplementary material. Effects 
sizes were calculated using Social Science Statistics (2018): 
they include Cohen’s d for independent and repeated-
measures t tests and Hedges' g (for different sample sizes).  
The molecular distribution of cooperative choices 
(i.e., X choice) is shown in Figure 3. It displays the 
aggregate choice (i.e., the AP) for each round and each 
group. Furthermore, group earnings per round are shown; 
they comprise the sum of individual payoffs and any 
awarded bonuses, which account for the highest spikes. 
From a visual data inspection, it seems that stable rates of 
cooperation were not achieved in any group. Most group 
choices feature at least one attempt to defect: for example, 
Groups 2, 5, and 7 feature flat choice trendlines ranging 
between one and two players defecting throughout the 
PDG. Players’ choices were generally characterized by a 
high variability, and the risk of defection (i.e., the fear of 
receiving the worst individual payoff) was especially high 
in Groups 4, 6 and 8. From the discontinued lines depicting 
group choice trends, only 3 groups (Groups 4, 8 and 9) show 
an increasing trend of cooperative choices, which granted 
the highest payoff whenever all 3 players chose X and were 
awarded a bonus. Whether the increase is due to the 
experimental manipulation of the market feedback is 
discussed in the next section. 
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Figure 4 displays a molar distribution of 
cooperative choices, measured as total players’ and group 
earnings for each condition. With the exception of Group 9, 
which featured a stronger effect of the market feedback 
compared to all other groups, Groups 1-3 (i.e., no-CF) 
earned on average more than Groups 4-9 (i.e., CF - Mno_CF 
= €points 2806, SD = 188.6; MCF = €points 2666, SD = 
160.3). However, the means of the groups were not 
significantly different t(7) = 1.17, p = .28, [g = .83]: Table 






Figure 4. Number of cooperative responses and number of awarded bonuses, contingent on purely cooperative responses. 
Note. The principal Y-axis depicts €points on a group earnings scale and the secondary Y-axis depicts €points on 
individual players’ earnings scale. MF refers to market feedback and CF refers to cultural feedback. 
 
Players’ Cooperative X Choice 
Analyses were conducted on mean cooperation 
rates (i.e., X choices) of the 30 five-round blocks, for each 
player in each group. Thus, blocks 1-8 represent choices 
without the market feedback (i.e., no-MF or control), and 
blocks 9-30 represent choices with the market feedback 
(i.e., MF or experimental) for all 9 groups. Next, averages 
were calculated for groups without the cultural feedback (1-
3) and with the cultural feedback (Groups 4-9). In contrast 
to the market feedback, the cultural feedback included 
information on the both players’ and group earnings. Hence, 
it was not possible to discriminate which type of feedback 
exerted the strongest control on cooperative behavior, and 
only ratios of X choices per block were measured. Ratios 
were calculated accounting for the occurrence of X choices 
from any player of each group within a period of 5 
consecutive rounds.  
A mixed repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted to investigate the impact of cultural and market 
feedback on the production of individual cooperative 
choices (i.e., X choice), for each of the 30 blocks. Within 
subjects, there was a significant main effect of the market 
feedback F(1, 28) = 6.50, p = .02, ηp2 = .19. The interaction 
effect between market and cultural feedback was not 
significant, F(1, 28) = 0.86, p = .36, ηp2 = .03. Between 
subjects, there was not a significant effect of the cultural 
feedback on the players’ cooperative choices F(1, 28) = 
0.53, p = .48, ηp2 = .02. Table 3 (included as 
supplementary material) reports within (a) and between 
(b) effects of the independent variables on cooperative AP 
of the groups. 
In order to further investigate the relationship of 
the market feedback on cooperative choices, a paired-
samples t-test was performed between means of the groups 
exposed to the market feedback, plotted in Figure 5(a). A 
significant effect was found between the means of groups 
in the first blocks of rounds without the market feedback 
(no-MF) and the subsequent blocks of rounds with market 
feedback (MF) t(29) = 2.40, p = .02, d = .44: this effect was 
moderate and is reported in Table 4 (included as 
supplementary material). Although the introduction of the 
market feedback had positive effects on players’ 
cooperative choices, these do not necessarily comprise 
IBCs, inasmuch as a behavioral contingency term for one 
player may not functionally precede of follow those of the 
other players. 
Group Cooperative Aggregate Product 3X 
The introduction of the market feedback was 
hypothesized to positively reinforce cooperative behavior 
among the members of each group. This was measured as the 
rate between a fully cooperative AP (i.e., 3X) and all possible 
APs (i.e., 2X1Y, 2Y1X, and 3Y). Cooperation rates were 
normalized between control and experimental conditions, as 
market feedback was awarded contingent on AP 3X 
throughout 36% of the total PDG duration. 
A mixed repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to 
investigate the impact of market and cultural feedback on the 
production of cooperative APs. Within subjects, there was not 
a significant main effect of the market feedback F(1, 7) = 0.68, 
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p = .44, ηp2 = .09, nor was there a significant interaction 
between market feedback and cultural feedback F(1, 7) = 2.00, 
p = .20, ηp2 = .22. Similarly, between subjects, there was not a 
significant effect of the cultural feedback on cooperative APs 
F(1, 7) = 1.06, p = .34, ηp2 = .13. Table 5 (included as 
supplementary material) reports both within (a) and between 
(b) effects of the independent variables on group cooperative 
APs. 
Post-hoc tests were not performed, as only 2 levels 
per independent variable were programmed. Nevertheless, as 
displayed in Figure 5(b), marginal means of groups exposed to 
the market feedback underwent a decrease concerning the 
cultural feedback condition. Marginal means of groups that 
were exposed to the market feedback were similar from 
without- to with exposure to the cultural feedback. Hence, 
estimated marginal means resulting from the interaction 
between market and cultural feedback were tested by 
performing 2 independent-samples t-tests. However, no 
significant effect was found between the conditions with 
cultural feedback and no market feedback, t(4.11) = 1.63, p = 
.17, [g = 1.15] (Levene’s test indicated unequal variances (F = 
.01, p = .90), so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 7 to 
4.1) and cultural feedback with exposure to the market 
feedback, t(7) = -0.94, p = .93, [g = .07] (Table 6, included as 
supplementary material). In sum, these results suggest that 
group cooperation measured as AP 3X was highest when 
participants were least exposed to feedback (or when 




Figure 5. Estimated marginal means of cooperation, per each control and experimental condition: (a) depicts rates of 
choice X, and (b) depicts rates of AP 3X. 
Note. MF = Market feedback; CF = Cultural feedback. The grey line marked as No_MF (control) depicts exposure to the 
market feedback; the black line marked as MF (experimental) depicts exposure to the market feedback. No_CF (control) 
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DISCUSSION 
The PDG experiment included in this study sets the 
occasion for proposing a cultural selectionist perspective of 
cooperation in a closed marked scenario. Whenever faced 
between a choice between X and Y, each player’s behavior 
was concurrently exposed to the effects of individual and 
cultural selection. Because bonuses were contingent on the 
production of the target AP 3X, selection and maintenance 
of cooperative choices were programmed to override 
defection. This was the rational strategy for maximizing 
both players and group earnings. Furthermore, this PDG 
addressed the role of feedback on establishing and 
maintaining a cultural practice. Although X and Y 
represented hypothetical products, utilizing the closed 
market scenario enhances the relevance of the PDG within 
organizational research. Specifically, differentiating 
between the functions of reinforcing and informative 
feedback (e.g., Ramaprasad, 1983) contributes to increasing 
the technical precision of the terms in the field of 
organizational behavior and beyond. 
In organizational settings, examples of 
cooperation may include delivery of timely and targeted 
feedback shared by employees and managers. Feedback can 
be measured along a number of dimensions, including 
direction, frequency, quality and timing. Since the second 
industrial revolution, the literature on performance 
management suggests that feedback is an exclusive top-
down process. In modern organizations, this practice has 
evolved into a dialogue-oriented dynamic, and 
subsequently into a network-based exchange of 
information. There has been an exponential increase in 
possible nodes and contingencies of interaction between 
members. This increase includes all directions of delivering 
feedback to one another: upwards, downwards and 
horizontally (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2002; Prue & 
Fairbank, 2008). 
Although several aspects of the game were 
directed towards enhancing cooperation (e.g., small number 
of participants, “conservative” payoff matrix, overt choices, 
increasing market feedback, etc.), low cooperation rates 
were initiated and maintained. For example, concerning the 
number of participants, while the classic two-persons PDG 
has been extensively used in experiments, there seem to be 
more contradictory experimental data in settings involving 
three or more participants, resulting in more individual-
rewarding rates of responses (Butler, Burbank, & Chisholm, 
2011; Hirshleifer & Rasmusen, 1989; Marwell & Schmitt, 
1972; Yi & Rachlin, 2004). Furthermore, the instructions 
(available as supplementary material) included a nudge 
towards enhancing participants’ cooperation, but the choice 
of verb cooperate did not seem to affect their choices. This 
suggests that the participants’ behavior was under the 
control of contingencies of individual and group 
reinforcement, and not governed by the rule of cooperating 
included in the instructions. Differently from previous 
studies (Ortu et al., 2012; Costa et al., 2012), the 
metacontingency was not regularly established between 
stable cooperation (i.e., the culturant, seen as recurrent 
individual cooperative choice behavior and its effect on 
maximizing group earnings) and the positive contingent 
group consequence (i.e., the market feedback). This finding 
is contrasting with the predicted high rates of cooperation 
embedded in the experimental apparatus. 
Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. 
First, the PDG uses a “pen and paper” procedure, which 
might be improved by programming dedicated software. 
Using software allows investigators to retain high levels of 
standardization, avoid possible biases on the experimenter’s 
side, and exert control on other environmental variables. 
We also suggest extending the number of rounds played to 
allow for a more sensible investigation of the establishment 
and maintenance of metacontingencies. Data from the pilot 
preceding the experiment indicated that the game duration 
seemed to be adequate, for it was sufficiently long for 
observing relatively stable rates of cooperation, yet short 
enough to be applied in organizational settings without 
penalizing the workers’ productivity. Whether the players 
were aware of the predetermined game duration did not 
seem to affect the frequency of their choices and strategies, 
“even though the famous ‘backwards induction’ argument 
would predict so” (Normann & Wallace, 2011, in Ortu et 
al., 2012, p. 113). While this variable was not systematically 
manipulated, the awareness of the total number of trials 
may have affected the overall rate of defection (e.g., by 
backward induction; see Aumann, 1995). Nevertheless, 
stable rates of cooperation were not achieved in any group. 
Alternatively, the players might be replaced with new ones 
after a certain number of rounds to investigate the 
transmission of cultural practices as members interchange 
(as new-entering members replace old-exiting ones; see 
Sandaker, 2009). 
Third, the participants of this study did not receive 
any cash payment based on their performance throughout 
the game. Although cash payments following an experiment 
represent a common procedure in experimental economics 
laboratories, other modalities of expressing gratitude for the 
players’ time might not necessarily affect their 
performance. For example, performance-based payments 
might be replaced by cash or prize raffles among top 
ranking players or groups (controlling for within- or 
between-group competition). 
Fourth, there are limitations embedded in the 
artificial setting of the experiment. Without excluding that 
some players might have considered the PDG to be similar 
to a previously experienced closed market scenario, the fact 
of labeling it as a game might have prompted the players to 
choose defect over cooperate to a larger extent. The allusion 
in many cultures to a game setting calls for a winner and, 
necessarily, at least one loser to emerge. According to 
Bixenstine et al. (1966), “conceivably, anything construed 
as a “game” elicits in our culture a very stereotyped, 
competitive response set” (p. 489). 
Finally, in the remainder of this section, we briefly 
account for the four sources of feedback identified 
throughout this work. Instances of peer feedback were not 
formally recorded during the experiment. They may have 
influenced the players’ choices to some extent, although not 
manifestly so (e.g., rising from their seats as a sign of 
disappointment) or explicitly uttered. For example, because 
the players could see one another and their 23 most recent 
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choices, it is possible that the availability of cultural 
feedback was influenced by the fact that groups had access 
to all players’ choices. However, no empirical evidence was 
collected in support to this claim. In fact, the participants 
did not engage in any verbal communication with one 
another, nor with the experimenter. Our findings are 
consistent with previous work stating that “cooperative 
gestures toward a non-cooperative partner in the three-
person game had much less chance of eliciting cooperation 
in return” (Marwell & Schmitt, 1972, p. 382). Although the 
main scope of this study was not to explore players’ rule-
governed verbal behavior, our findings support the claim 
that groups in which no vocal communication is allowed 
engage less in cooperative behavior (Costa et al., 2012; 
Sampaio et al., 2013), for the selection of culturants is also 
less consistent (see also Soares et al., 2018) 
With regard to the PDG setting, the buyer feedback 
was supposedly the most influential source of control of the 
players’ choices and, thus, earnings. Namely, it 
programmed for each player’s individual earnings as a 
function of both their own and the other players’ choice. 
This suggest that a relative earnings-driven strategy (i.e., 
earning more than the other players) was preferred to a more 
efficient absolute earnings-driven strategy (i.e., earning the 
most, regardless of the other players). For example, from a 
visual inspection of Figure 4, it is clear that all players 
earned less than what they could have if (a) they 
consistently defected the other two players in their group 
(max =1500€points) and (b) if they cooperated 
unconditionally (max = €points 1200+550[bonus]). 
Moreover, average earnings per player (M = €points 911) 
and group (M = €points 2734) suggest that performance 
settled at 52% of capability, which comprises an 
interestingly mediocre result worthwhile of further 
experimental and applied investigations. 
After the players first acknowledged receipt of a 
market feedback, whose conditions were not stated in the 
instructions, no stable pattern of cooperation emerged. This 
may indicate that: (a) learning did not occur among the 
players, for group cooperative strategies could not be 
maintained, or (b) learning may have occurred insofar as a 
player learned not to cooperate as the others in their group 
did not cooperate often enough (Anonymous, personal 
communication, March 4, 2020). In fact, choice X and 
bonus awarded as many as 12€points, representing the 
rational (and most lucrative) choice for each player and their 
group. Although unlikely, the linear increase of bonuses 
may have been seen as selecting current IBCs that involved 
defection. The players were informed of how many rounds 
the game featured, but not of the magnitude and frequency 
of bonus increases (i.e., assuming they were insensible to 
temporal and probabilistic discounting). Contrary to this 
prediction, few cooperative choices were recorded at all, 
and this finding calls for a cautious approach. In fact, it may 
be argued that no metacontingency was in effect, since the 
players were not allowed to engage in overt instances of 
coordination through verbal behavior (cf. communicate) 
beyond timid non-verbal efforts to influence each other’s 
subsequent choice that may have occurred. Conversely, 
IBCs do not necessarily require (verbal) communication for 
metacontingencies to be established, as demonstrated with 
animal subjects (de Carvalho et al., 2018) and in the absence 
of communication (Borba, Tourinho, & Glenn, 2014; Costa 
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it is granted that establishing the 
metacontingency is harder in the absence of 
communication, especially when the iterated PDG produces 
a situation of concurrence between individual and group 
consequences. Lastly, we recorded that groups exposed to 
the cultural feedback defected more frequently than groups 
exposed to the market feedback did. Groups exposed to the 
cultural feedback may have displayed a lack of adaptability, 
insofar as the market feedback exerted a stronger control on 
cooperative choice behavior than the cultural feedback. 
Alternatively, the chances of cooperation by one player may 
have decreased assuming that discriminative control 
presented how often the other players did not cooperate 
(Anonymous, personal communication, March 4, 2020). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The informative function of feedback affects 
players’ cooperative choice behavior in a PDG, insofar as it 
grants higher earnings for each individual player and not 
necessarily for their group. Nevertheless, the reinforcing 
function of feedback did not exert strong control enough on 
selecting and maintaining a culture of cooperation within 
groups (i.e., producing the AP 3X). The model of Homo 
economicus predicts maximizing individual outcomes, 
which in the setup of this PDG corresponds to maximizing 
group outcomes. However, players generally seemed to 
prefer alternate instances of mutual defection to relatively 
steady cooperation. They displayed irrational choice 
behavior, putting risky and relative individual gains before 
sustainable and absolute group gains. Although this 
statement may be regarded as internalist, insofar as 
irrational choice may suggest that individuals “reason” in 
deciding, we maintain that the players responded to the 
contingencies set in the current and historical context. 
(Anonymous, personal communication, March 4, 2020). 
The study of metacontingencies within a closed 
market scenario or system consents the understanding of 
how members of an organization are interdependent. The 
delivery of common contingent group consequence sets 
the occasion for putting group interests before individual 
ones and increasing performance. Thus, 
metacontingencies are tools of cooperation and not of 
defection. The stronger the influence of feedback on its 
contingent choice behavior, the more suitable it is to 
replace the non-technical concept of feedback with the 
term reinforcement. Identifying the frames that maintain 
certain classes of behavior is functional to the 
maintenance of any organization, market and society. We 
suggest starting from the design of feedback embedded in 
these systems, for sustaining cooperation among their 
members. 
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You are the co-owner of a manufacturing company, together with the other two players, and you cooperate with them in order to 
sell one of the two products you manufacture, to the one and only buyer, represented by the experimenter. 
Your goal is to maximize your earnings, and this depends both on your individual decision and that of each other player.  
At the beginning of each round, you are asked to decide whether to sell your product X or Y to the buyer, who is always willing to 
buy, by simultaneously showing the letter of the product of your choice at the sign of the experimenter. Your machinery can only 
produce one kind of product per round; therefore you can only choose between X or Y, not both. 
During some parts of the game, each of you might have the opportunity of receiving a market feedback, when specific criteria are 
met: the buyer shall communicate its entity to all players, when applicable. 
You are not allowed to communicate with each other throughout the game, nor is any sort of negotiation with the buyer permitted, 
concerning either quantities or prices. It is in your best interest to formulate an offer, since every sale is associated with a gain, 
according to the following payoffs: 
 
Manufacturers’ produce  Product X (€points) Product Y (€points) 
3 X / 0 Y +8 - 
2 X / 1 Y + 3 + 10 
1 X / 2 Y + 10 + 3 
0 X / 3 Y - + 1 
 
This game will last exactly 150 rounds and you may keep track of the latest sets of decisions, payoffs and updated real-time scores 
on the projected screen in front of you at all times.  
Are there any questions before we begin? 
Bidding is open for round #1: what will you offer, product X or Y?  
 
 




Difference of means of group earnings, equal variances assumed 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 











Equal variances assumed .175 .688 1.176 7 .278 140.500 119.426 -141.899 422.899 
Equal variances not assumed   1.106 3.523 .339 140.500 127.048 -231.914 512.914 



































Mixed repeated-measures ANOVA within (a) and between (b) subjects on individual cooperative choice 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Market_feedback Sphericity Assumed .026 1 .026 6.502 .017 .188 
Greenhouse-Geisser .026 1.000 .026 6.502 .017 .188 
Huynh-Feldt .026 1.000 .026 6.502 .017 .188 
Lower-bound .026 1.000 .026 6.502 .017 .188 
Market_feedback * 
Cultural_feedback 
Sphericity Assumed .003 1 .003 .861 .361 .030 
Greenhouse-Geisser .003 1.000 .003 .861 .361 .030 
Huynh-Feldt .003 1.000 .003 .861 .361 .030 
Lower-bound .003 1.000 .003 .861 .361 .030 
Error(MF) Sphericity Assumed .111 28 .004    
Greenhouse-Geisser .111 28.000 .004    
Huynh-Feldt .111 28.000 .004    




Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept 13.359 1 13.359 2993.583 .000 .991 
Cultural_feedback .002 1 .002 .535 .470 .019 
Error .125 28 .004    
(b) 












Difference of means of market feedback on individual cooperative choice 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 No-Market_feedback – 
Market_feedback 
.039 .089 .016 .006 .072 2.399 29 .023 
Note. df= degrees of freedom.  




Mixed repeated-measures ANOVA within (a) and between (b) subjects on cooperative aggregate product 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Market_feedback Sphericity Assumed .003 1 .003 .682 .436 .089 
Greenhouse-Geisser .003 1.000 .003 .682 .436 .089 
Huynh-Feldt .003 1.000 .003 .682 .436 .089 
Lower-bound .003 1.000 .003 .682 .436 .089 
Market_feedback * 
Cultural_feedback 
Sphericity Assumed .008 1 .008 2.007 .199 .223 
Greenhouse-Geisser .008 1.000 .008 2.007 .199 .223 
Huynh-Feldt .008 1.000 .008 2.007 .199 .223 
Lower-bound .008 1.000 .008 2.007 .199 .223 
Error(Market_feedback) Sphericity Assumed .028 7 .004    
Greenhouse-Geisser .028 7.000 .004    
Huynh-Feldt .028 7.000 .004    
Lower-bound .028 7.000 .004    
(a) 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept .399 1 .399 64.378 .000 .902 
Cultural_feedback .007 1 .007 1.058 .338 .131 
Error .043 7 .006    
(b) 
Note. df= degrees of freedom.  




Difference of means of market feedback on cooperative aggregate product 
Independent Samples Test between market feedback conditions for AP 3X 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 





95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
No-Market_feedback Equal variances assumed .015 .905 1.628 7 .147 .085 .053 -.039 .210 
Equal variances not assumed   1.631 4.107 .176 .085 .052 -.059 .230 
Market_feedback Equal variances assumed .665 .442 -.094 7 .928 -.005 .049 -.119 .110 
Equal variances not assumed   -.118 6.955 .909 -.005 .039 -.096 .087 
Note. df = degrees of freedom 
 
